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Australian National University and University of Queensland
tim.legrand@anu.edu.au, s.bronitt@law.uq.edu.au
In the months leading up to November’s G20 summit in 2014, Brisbane’s residents
would have been forgiven for anticipating the outbreak of a local civil war. Media
outlets were leading with headlines stating, among other sensational claims, that
‘G20 anarchists vow chaos and mayhem for Brisbane’s streets’,1 ‘Black Bloc tactics
aim for Brisbane G20 shock and awe’2 and ‘Destructive protest plan for G20’.3
Meanwhile, some of the most severe restrictions on civil liberties seen in Australia
in recent years were legislated by the Queensland parliament. The G20 Safety and
Security Act 2013 (Qld) (the G20 Act) was passed with little demur by a chamber
that was only divided over the question of whether the laws were severe enough,
with Queensland opposition police spokesman Bill Byrne MP declaring himself
‘surprised’ at the leniency of some of the sentencing provisions and the ‘minimalist’
approach to restricted areas.4 Of course, in the event the much-anticipated violence
did not occur, and the media’s pre-summit hyperbole was exposed as just that.
Rather more prosaically — and accurately — the post-event headlines dutifully
reported ‘Passionate, but mostly peaceful protests’ and ‘G20 protest day wraps up
peacefully’. Given that previous G20 summits in London and Toronto saw out-
breaks of considerable disorder, we might succumb to the temptation of declaring
the peaceful protests in Brisbane to be a vindication of the heavy powers granted
by the Queensland parliament. But we believe that to do so would be egregious.
Here we reflect on the historical and political motivations underpinning the G20
Act, and draw attention to the rather more measured policing strategy employed
by the Queensland Police Service (QPS). We argue that the safety and security of
G20 participants and protesters owed little to the restrictive powers granted by the
G20 Act, but resulted from a policing strategy that successfully married traditional
and modern precepts of policing large events.
Political dissent in Queensland: An ignoble history
Three decades ago, the distinguished lawyer, social justice advocate and Jesuit Frank
Brennan SJ published a book titled Too Much Order with Too Little Law.5 It was
a masterful study of the role of political protest in modern democracy, tracing the
history of political protest in England and Australia, and linking his thesis to the
ways in which fundamental rights and liberties had been severely and unjustifiably
eroded in Queensland over the previous decades. It would be well known to many
readers of this publication — often at first hand — that between 1977 and 1979,
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the then Premier of Queensland, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, placed a ban on all street
demonstrations. The effect of his edict was that public assemblies in Brisbane,
however peaceful, were for all practical purposes outlawed. In the absence of any
constitutional or legislative right to free expression or peaceful assembly, protesters
were vulnerable to arrest for a range of summary offences, such as obstruction and
public nuisance. As Brennan noted, ‘police refused to confer with demonstration
organizers and adopted the tactic of all-out confrontation at demonstrations, which
resulted in 1,972 arrests’.6
The Fitzgerald Royal Commission (1987–89) exposed the culture of corruption
within the Bjelke-Petersen government and among senior police, and ultimately
signalled the end of National Party rule in 1989.7 The incoming Labor govern-
ment, led by Wayne Goss, tackled corruption with reformist zeal: it established the
Criminal Justice Commission to investigate corruption in public office and abol-
ished the Queensland Police Special Branch, which for decades had exercised an
unlawful covert surveillance over ‘subversive’ political protest groups. Perhaps the
most significant measure of that time was the Peaceful Assembly Act 1992 (PAA).
The PAA may be viewed as one of the most enduring legacies of this era, a sym-
bolic statement signalling a change in political culture and the end of the oppressive
policing of political dissent. Peaceful protest in Queensland was not something that
citizens enjoyed under terms set by the government of the day or police: it was
now a secure legal right protected by legislation. Queensland had come a long way
from its zero-tolerance attitude to public street demonstrations in the late 1970s.
For the first time, the law expressly recognised the civil and political rights of those
protesting, placing limits on the powers of police to obstruct protesters, rather than
vice versa.
The PAA provides immunity from liability for various laws that would otherwise
prohibit or restrict the exercise of that right, such as laws governing the move-
ment of traffic and pedestrians, as well as loitering and obstruction offences (PAA,
section 6). The immunity is available only where the assembly has been subject to
prior police approval, though participation in an assembly that has not previously
been approved does not of itself constitute an offence. Organisers and protesters
participating without approval simply forfeit their immunity from prosecution un-
der prescribed offences (PAA sections 3, 6(1)). This framework regulating public
assemblies in Queensland conforms to the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR), since the grounds for restricting assemblies precisely mirror
the restrictions applied in Article 21. The PAA aims to balance the rights of those
participating in the public assembly against the legitimate interests of others. The
right to peaceful assembly — like freedom of expression — is not absolute. The
legislative objectives contained in section 2(1)(c) provide that the existence of
the right to participate in public assemblies is subject only to such restrictions
as are necessary and reasonable in a democratic society in the interests of:
 public safety
 public order, or
 protection of rights and freedoms of other persons.
The bold departure from the past needs to be placed in its historical context. With
the passage of the PAA, Queensland became the first state in Australia to expressly
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protect the right to engage in a peaceful assembly. Before its passage, the right
to engage in protest and freedom of speech were not positive legal rights. Rather,
consistent with traditional English constitutional principles, civil and political free-
doms were residual liberties. As the celebrated nineteenth-century constitutional
lawyer A.V. Dicey proclaimed, under common law systems like that of England,
individuals were free to assemble and process on the highways, exercising the cher-
ished liberties of the common law to ‘pass and repass’. The enjoyment of such civil
liberties was not dependent on being enshrined in a constitution or statute, and
could be enjoyed freely by any citizen, individually or in assemblies, provided that
no other laws of the land were violated.
As Brennan catalogues in his book, the problem with this classical liberal model
is that there is no shortage of laws that fetter protests: the expansion of police
summary offences and traffic regulations in the twentieth century has extensively
interfered with these freedoms. Parliament alone was not responsible for this dimin-
ishing residue of liberty: as numerous commentators have pointed out, the courts
and the common law were not always conducive to liberty either. The twentieth
century saw a judicial expansion of breach of the peace powers, encouraging in-
creased police reliance on these broad and discretionary powers. Indeed, through
the latter half of the twentieth century, courts in the United Kingdom and Australia
progressively expanded the scope of common law powers to use force to prevent
disorder.8 This included the power of the police to impose ‘prior restraint’ upon
the peaceful conduct of protesters on the ground that their conduct was reason-
ably believed to be likely to provoke an imminent breach of the peace by others.
The reasonableness of the police officers’ belief that disorder was ‘imminent’ was
rarely (if ever) challenged in the courts. In the 1980s, the increasing challenges to
conservative political authority in the United Kingdom and Australia were often
met with forceful police responses, resulting in violent clashes between police and
protesters.9
Against this broader backdrop, the PAA was a clear departure from prevailing
liberal models of political freedom. In the absence of any national, constitution-
ally entrenched Bill of Rights, the PAA was also an expression of the importance
of honouring Australia’s obligations under the ICCPR. Indeed, at the time of the
enactment of the PAA, the ongoing and unresolved debate about the value of such
constitutional reform had left Australia as one of the few common law systems that
lacked a Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights debate at the national level had stalled by
the mid-1990s; indeed, more than a decade would pass before another Australian
jurisdiction would enact legislation protecting the rights to freedom of expression
and public assembly. The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Victoria enacted
general human rights legislation in 2004 and 2006 respectively.10 These Acts fol-
lowed the model adopted in the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (HRA),11 which had
been introduced there by New Labour as part of its package of ‘constitutional mod-
ernisation’; the HRA was said to be ‘bringing home’ the European Convention of
Human Rights (ECHR). Equivalent legislation in the ACT and Victoria gave similar
effect to the ICCPR, and following the structure of a Covenant, contained sections
that protected both the right to freedom of expression (Article 19) and peaceful
assembly (Article 21). These rights were not absolute — for example, the right to
peaceful assembly could be subject to restrictions ‘necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public),
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the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others’ (Article 21(2)).
Prior to its enactment, there was little the Australian Constitution could of-
fer to shore up political freedom in Australia: the High Court, through a line of
decisions in the 1990s, had recognised an implied constitutional freedom of politi-
cal communication. Although this provided some measure of protection to public
protest,12 there remained doubts about the scope and limits of the doctrine and
the extent of protection for citizens participating in peaceful public protests and
demonstrations.13
G20 special legislation: Security, safety and combating civil
disobedience
The clashes and mass arrests associated with previous G20 protests in Toronto and
London were vivid reminders of what was at stake for protesters and police alike.
In Toronto in 2010, around 10,000 people attended the main protest. The police
were poorly prepared for the weight of such numbers, and attracted significant
criticism for heavy-handed interventions, and for using a little-known security
regulation enacted to counter saboteurs in World War II, to arbitrarily stop and
search individuals within specified protest areas. Though few injuries were reported,
there was widespread damage caused to the city and the police arrested over 1,100
people. Around 75 per cent of this number was subsequently released without
charge (having been detained for over twenty-four hours) and, of those charged,
only thirty-two people were eventually convicted. Similar scenes were seen during
the G20 Summit held in London in 2009. Approximately 35,000 people attended
peaceful demonstrations ahead of the summit. Yet sporadic disorder broke out in
protests on 1 and 2 April, attended by some 7,000 protesters, that were much more
dynamic and fast moving. It was in the midst of such protests that a newspaper
seller, Ian Tomlinson, was struck and killed by a police officer.
In the aftermath of the London protests, the Metropolitan Police were served
with numerous civil lawsuits alleging — among other things — inappropriate use
of force, wrongful arrest and wrongful deprivation of liberty. In one case, the police
arrested 66 protesters after raiding a building being used by a group of protesters:
the Metropolitan Police eventually paid out £3,500 (approximately A$6,000) in
compensation to those arrested in relation to claims of false imprisonment and
arrest. In both Toronto and London, significant numbers of police officers operating
in public order policing chose to conceal or remove their badge numbers, severely
impeding individual accountability.
Police forces were also quick to resort to the use of blanket indiscriminate
measures — such as ‘kettling’ large groups of protesters within a police cordon,
often for hours — which in turn attracted public opprobrium for the indiscriminate
and heavy-handed nature of the tactic. 14 The tactic is not unlawful — in 2012, a
decade-long legal challenge in the United Kingdom to the use of ‘kettling’ by police
failed, with the majority (fourteen to three) of the European Court of Human
Rights ultimately ruling that the tactic was not incompatible with the right to
peaceful protest under the Convention.15
The impact of the excesses of policing during these events was exacerbated by
the considerable amount of video footage recorded by witnesses. It is important
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to remember that we now live in an era of surveillance: technological advances
provide law enforcement officials with easy access to ubiquitous CCTV in public
and private spaces, but they also place mobile recording devices in the hands of
everyday citizens. These trends have, as Andrew Goldsmith points out, created a
new level of visibility for policing.16 You do not have to delve too far into social
media to see videos taken by protesters in London and Toronto alleging excessive
use of force by police at those protests. Increasingly, the behaviour of police is
not only on immediate display, but can be made a matter of permanent historical
public record on the internet. How the public perceives the police’s management of
protests goes some way to supporting or eroding public confidence in their abilities.
Indeed, it is perfectly possible for police officers to act within their legal powers, but
nevertheless lose the public’s confidence. We saw with the death of Ian Tomlinson
in the midst of the London G20 protests that it takes just one or two baton strikes
to undermine the public’s confidence in its police service. So the stakes are high:
perhaps the most treasured asset of any police force is the confidence the public has
in its ability to operate lawfully, with restraint and demonstrable fairness.
The G20 Safety and Security Act
Against the fraught backdrop of previous G20 protests, the history of repression
of protest in Queensland was bound to have an impact on the strategy adopted
for policing the G20 event. Clearly, the rights to engage in peaceful protest were
not at the forefront of the government or legislature’s concerns in drafting its
special legislation. Rather, as the title of the Act indicated, the overriding policy
objective of the G20 Safety and Security Act 2013 (Qld) was to promote the safety
and security of those attending the event.17 As has become increasingly common
for mega-events, special legislation was passed setting out the policing and security
arrangements, creating new powers that only apply for a specific place and duration.
Most significantly, the G20 Act suspended the operation of the PAA in declared
security areas, which did not bode well for the safety and security of protesters’
rights.
Readers of the G20 Act will be struck by the absence of any express reference
to Australia’s obligation to respect the fundamental civil and political rights of
protesters. Section 2 proclaims the primacy of its safety and security rationale:
The objectives of this Act are to provide police officers, non-State police officers
and appointed persons with special powers—
(a) to promote the safety and security of persons attending any part of the G20
meeting . . .
(b) to ensure the safety of members of the public from acts of civil disobedience
in relation to any part of the G20 meeting; and
(c) to protect property from damage from civil disobedience in relation to any
part of the G20 meeting; and
(d) to prevent acts of terrorism directly or indirectly related to any part of the
G20 meeting; and
(e) to regulate traffic and pedestrian movement to ensure the passage of motor-
cades related to any part of the G20 meeting is not impeded.
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Protesters were not conceived as legitimate rights-holders, but rather potential
law-breakers engaged in acts of ‘civil disobedience’. Significantly, this is the only
place in the G20 Act where ‘civil disobedience’ was mentioned, and terms like
peaceful protest or lawful assembly are never mentioned. At the outset, the G20
Act raised concern about its potential Draconian reach — indeed, much of the early
critical media commentary focused on the long, and almost comically exhaustive,
list of prohibited items that could not be brought into declared areas adjacent to
the G20 venues, including weapons, handcuffs, whips, kites, blowpipes, reptiles
and insects, kayaks, eggs, tin cans and much else besides. Of particular concern
was the prohibited status of placards larger than a prescribed size or amplification
equipment (i.e. loud hailers). The legislation did not make possession an arrestable
offence per se, but there was an onus on those found in possession of these articles
to establish a ‘reasonable excuse’ for possession.
Policing the protests: Affirming the dialogue model
Ensuring that individuals have an ‘equality of protest opportunity’ is a new policing
responsibility in the twenty-first century. In a public presentation prior to the enact-
ment of the G20 Act, one of the authors echoed a recommendation by a UK polic-
ing authority that police employ a ‘no surprises communication philosophy with
protesters’ (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, Adapting to Protest —
Nurturing the British Model of Policing’, 25 November 2009) and urged the QPS
to ‘open up a dialogue with protesters at any and every opportunity’. These were not
especially prescient insights; rather, they were merely observations derived from the
origins of modern policing and research around effective policing at large events.
Policing scholars have widely endorsed dialogue, engagement and liaison in police
management of protests,18 with a growing body of research establishing that police
liaison with protest groups broadens the opportunity for ‘problem solving, conflict
reduction, limit setting, and mediating’19 in large-scale protests. Much of the criti-
cism levelled at the policing operations undertaken in the London and Toronto G20
summits focused on the excessive use of force and the failure of police commanders
to engage in meaningful dialogue with protest groups as a first resort.
In the months leading up to the G20 meetings in Cairns and Brisbane, the spec-
tre of violent protests seen in London and Toronto dominated media coverage via
two key themes. The first theme clearly signalled the militaristic defences of the
pending security operation. For example, one outlet reported, ‘Brisbane set to go
into lockdown for G20’, detailing plans for ‘military-style checkpoints’,20 while
another proclaimed, ‘Brisbane’s G20 fortress emerges’.21 In at least one instance,
the military nature of the security operation was elided with the protests: ‘Snipers
in position for G20 as new threat emerges,’ announced the Courier-Mail on the
morning of the G20 summit. An alarming headline indeed, yet further reading of
the story reveals the headline to be misleading. The ‘snipers in position’ were part
of a long-planned security strategy and entirely unconnected to the ‘new threat’,
which turned out to be from the non-violent ‘hacktivist’ protest group Anonymous.
The second theme, which drew extensively on dramatic and eye-catching images,
focused on the prospect of chaos wrought by the so-called ‘Black Bloc’22 — anar-
chists and other anti-establishment groups. Headlines presented possible scenarios
of chaotic protests: ‘Black Bloc tactics aim for Brisbane G20 shock and awe’;
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‘Anarchy group threatens G20’;23 ‘Terror and riots twin threat at Brisbane sum-
mit’;24 ‘State of Anarchy: Policing Queensland for the G20’.25
Together, these ‘militaristic’ and ‘anarchistic’ media themes generated expecta-
tions of a violent confrontation between violent lawless protesters on one side and
well-equipped security forces on the other. The combined effect of this discourse
was to portend a hostile protest environment, one that was highly dissuasive to
those considering voicing their legitimate and peaceful dissent. As we know, the re-
ality of the protests was far removed from these imagined scenarios. In the midst of
stifling heat, around 2,000 people participated in protests that were almost entirely
devoid of disruption. Groups advocating action on climate change, Indigenous
rights, labour reform and so on protested peacefully with none of the anticipated
‘anarchism’ in Brisbane’s ‘fortress’.
In truth, none of the actions taken — the temporary suspension of the PAA, the
tattoo of media-led war-drums or the potential breadth of the police powers granted
by the G20 Act — had much impact on the policing strategy that was employed.
Assistant Commissioner Katarina Carroll has publicly outlined the strategic and
logistical issues faced in ‘Operation Southern Cross’. Elaborating on these chal-
lenges in a public lecture titled ‘G20:20 Hindsight’,26 delivered shortly after the
conclusion of the G20, Assistant Commissioner Carroll reflected on scale of the
challenge of communicating the ‘right’ message across such a diverse force under
QPS command:
Whilst the tone and strategy was set at the (top), the challenge was to ensure that
all 6,400 police from 8 jurisdictions also shared our intent/understanding of our
legislation, our policy and our philosophy.27
To address this challenge, the ensuing policing strategy undertook two elements
that are instructive, in our view, for modern public-order policing. The first el-
ement addressed the challenge of temporarily integrating officers from disparate
commands into one G20 policing operation — one of the largest in Australia’s his-
tory — involving 6,400 police drawn from across Australia and New Zealand. In
the planning phase of the G20, the QPS consulted heavily with police commanders
involved in the management of the protests in London and Toronto, in an effort to
learn lessons and best-practices from those experiences. They also developed spe-
cial training and briefing products provided to all G20 police officers. The starting
philosophy for general duties policing was contained in an Aide Memoire provided
to G20 officers:
Human Rights
Officers are reminded of their obligations with respect to human rights such as:
 Free Speech
 Safety from Violence
 To Peacefully protest (speak against) a government or group
 The right to express oneself.
This ‘front and square’ human rights philosophy was echoed in a compulsory on-
line training platform for all police officers — the ‘G20 Safety and Security Online
Learning Product’ — which spanned, inter alia, lessons arising from London and
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Toronto police experiences, the facilitation of lawful protests, ethical and profes-
sional conduct, human rights and police integrity.28 Officers additionally received
a G20 Policy and Procedures Manual, specifying common policing protocols to be
employed by G20 police during the summit. The common policing philosophy and
protocols were reinforced during the G20 policing deployment in an ‘Executive
Welcome’ and ‘Professional Standards Briefing’. The policing philosophy, and its
core message, comports with our view that, irrespective of the noise and discomfort
caused by protest messages — including those directed at the police for their role
in the stolen generations, police shootings and Aboriginal deaths in custody —
police are bound to uphold the human rights of everyone. Indeed, the human rights
model of policing suggests that police intervention is needed as much to ensure that
the rights of the less vocal, and more vulnerable, protest groups are not drowned
out or trampled upon — this would be literally the case in relation to the Free
Tibet protesters who staged a poignant silent ‘die-in’ protest at the G20 summit in
Brisbane.
The second element of the QPS policing strategy drew on lessons learned from
the failure of policing agencies in London and Toronto to properly engage with
protest groups prior to the planned demonstrations. In the months leading up
to the G20 Summit, the QPS sought to engage with ‘issue-motivated groups’ to
open up dialogue, foster mutual trust between protesters and police, and promote
understanding of protesters’ rights and responsibilities and the police’s role during
protests — specifically the role of police negotiators who, throughout the event,
worked extensively and closely with protesters and police commanders on the
ground.29 This emphasis on early and meaningful communication with protest
groups, irrespective of their politics, stands out as the crucial plank in the policing
strategy. Contact with protest groups was sought and clear lines of communication
established around the planning for the event. As Assistant Commissioner Carroll
reflected in her ‘G20:20 Hindsight’ speech:
The engagement and the communication with the protest groups commenced
early, it was meaningful and it was genuine. We will always support people’s
fundamental right of expression and peaceful assembly. We even facilitate it.30
By the time of the summit, around twenty-six groups had been in contact with
the QPS to liaise on their protest plans. The result, which may well have been exag-
gerated by the relatively low number of protesters, was one that served the interests
of all: the peaceful articulation of political dissent. Over the weekend of the summit,
just sixteen individuals were arrested — mostly for minor offences unconnected to
protesting — and the police issued 27 exclusion notices. That the QPS preferred
diplomacy and early liaison with the public to the heavy powers provided by the
G20 Act is a reminder that security and safety can be achieved by public consent
rather than police compulsion. It is also pertinent to point out that such diplo-
macy runs true to some of the founding precepts of policing in liberal democracies,
codified in Peel’s Principles of Policing, which in 1829 enjoined newly formed pro-
fessional police thus: ‘To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion,
advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an
extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order.’ Such approaches
reinforce the importance of ‘policing by consent’ in liberal democracies, and the
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manner in which these were operationalised in the G20 protests are an affirmation
of the continued relevance of Peel’s principles to modern policing.
Conclusion
The challenge for policing is often presented in public policy terms as a balancing
act between, on the one hand, the civil and political rights of protesters and, on the
other, the safety and security of others members of the community. The quest for
‘balance’ in our legal system provides an attractive optic for politicians introducing
laws, and it has infused across public order and many other fields of law. Terrorism
in particular has generated a substantial body of commentary on the challenge of
the executive, legislature and judiciary striking the right balance between liberty
and security, including whether balancing should be applied as the appropriate
model to guide the exercise of executive or judicial discretion — or, more broadly,
the future of law reform.31
The balancing debate resonates with earlier debates in criminal justice. In the
1960s, Herbert Packer presented the criminal justice system as a conflict between
two models: ‘crime control’ versus ‘due process’. In his influential account, Packer
observed that crime control model aimed to promote public order and secure
convictions — a responsibility that rested primarily on the shoulders of the police.
Due process, on the other hand, aimed to control state power and uphold the rights
of individuals suspected of serious crime — a responsibility that rests on shoulders
of the judges and courts. In Packer’s battle model, an ‘assembly line’ of crime
control is confronted with the ‘obstacle course’ of due process. As a conceptual
framework, this binary model has intuitive appeal to policy-makers and politicians
alike, though it has generated substantial critiques. The most significant, by Doreen
McBarnet, maintains that due process does not invariably impede crime control —
when legal protections are subject to further empirical scrutiny, their impact on
practice may be negligible, or indeed may in fact be conducive to conviction! As
McBarnet pointed out in her research on summary criminal processes, in many
instances ‘due process is for crime control’.32
Applying a socio-legal theoretical lens to the G20 widens our perspective on the
policy debate. The ‘law in the books’ (viz., the G20 Act) did absolutely nothing
to uphold the rights of lawful and peaceful protest — indeed, the suspension of
the PAA was symbolic of just how far the safety and security rationale of the G20
Act justified this extensive (albeit temporary) derogation from the legal protection
accorded to peaceful protests. By contrast, the ‘law in action’ (viz., policing policy
and practice) required frontline police to operationalise their broad powers, cog-
nisant of their vital role in promoting human rights for everyone — to ensure the
protection of both public safety and human rights. The dialogue model of policing
promoted extensively by the Assistant Commissioner, Katarina Carroll of the QPS,
asserted the legitimacy of protesters’ rights to engage in peaceful protest, and that
there was an obligation of police to negotiate compliance with the Act in a fair and
transparent manner. This leadership tone is undoubtedly a significant part of the
success of the Operation Southern Cross.
It is hoped that the review of the G20 Act required within the next six months
can generate lessons to be learnt from the innovative policing strategies deployed,
and that future mega-event legislation can take human rights more seriously. The
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concern that there was ‘Too Much Order and Too Little Law’ did not manifest as
the problem at G20; indeed, there was no shortage of law defining police powers —
the problem was that the G20 Act failed to recognise anywhere the fundamental
importance and legitimacy of peaceful protest. The G20 summit may be viewed as
a lesson in how far policing in Queensland, and its leadership, have come since the
‘Joh years’. It is hoped that our current political leaders and legislators can learn
a similar lesson, and that they do not hesitate to embed respect for fundamental
human rights into future mega-events legislation such as the forthcoming Com-
monwealth Games on the Gold Coast. If the police can learn this critical lesson —
that promoting due process, diplomacy and fundamental human rights can be
conducive rather than inimical to crime control and public order — surely our
legislators and policy-makers can do the same.
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